Wealth, economic infrastructure, and monetary policy by Jerry L. Jordan
A country’s choice of institutions pro-
foundly affects its wealth and develop-
ment. Institutions constitute a nation’s
economic “infrastructure,” the frame-
work on which enterprise is built. Per-
haps the most important element sepa-
rating economic “haves” from “have-
nots” is whether these institutions—and
particularly public institutions—either
facilitate or confiscate production. One
of those institutional arrangements is the
monetary regime.
n n   The Nature and Causes 
of Economic Prosperity 
In 1776, Adam Smith published An
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations. His motivation
was to explain the large differences in
economic prosperity observed across
countries. That inquiry continues today,
and for essentially the same reason: The
gaps that separate prosperous from
foundering economies remain huge. As
we near the end of the twentieth century,
the richest countries in the world are
roughly 30 to 50 times wealthier than the
poorest ones—a truly astounding differ-
ence.1  Not only do we see large gaps in
wealth, but we also see tremendous vari-
ation in development. Some developing
countries—Saudi Arabia, Lesotho, and
Taiwan—tripled their wealth between
1960 and 1985, while others, such as
Zambia, Mozambique, and Madagascar,
were about three times wealthier in 1960
than they were 25 years later!
If we ask simple questions like, “Why
are some nations rich and others poor?”
or “Why do countries grow at different
rates?”, we get a simple answer: Rich
economies have greater resources per
capita—more capital, both human and
nonhuman, and better technology con-
necting the two. But this simple answer
only begs another question:  “Why do
some economies have high levels of cap-
ital and technology, while others don’t?” 
To answer this question, it is useful to
determine whether wealthier or faster-
growing economies share characteristics
that are not observed in poorer or slower-
growing ones. Investigations into this
issue have not been very revealing, and
economists have been frustrated by their
inability to identify common policies that
would explain a significant share of the
wealth differentials.2  But the lack of a
clear link between specific “growth”
policies and an economy’s ultimate pros-
perity has led us to think more broadly
about the state and prosperity. That is, the
policies that nations adopt may not be
individually revealing, but in their total-
ity they reflect an economic infrastruc-
ture that the state helps build. 
For example, viewed in isolation, an in-
crease in a nation’s educational effort
should have a decidedly positive influ-
ence on its wealth. However, such pro-
grams may still fail if the rate of taxa-
tion on labor income is high, transfers
between generations are large, or other
policies are in place that reduce peo-
ple’s incentive to add to their stock of
human capital. 
In the realm of economics, controlled
experiments are not possible. At rare
times, though, natural experiments pre-
sent themselves, and recently we have
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role of the economic infrastructure in
influencing nations’ prosperity. In the
last seven years, at least 15 newly created
market economies have emerged within
the former Soviet Empire, in addition to
the liberated Eastern European countries.
Perhaps not surprisingly, these emerging
economies have experienced vastly vary-
ing degrees of prosperity. Consider that
since 1989, the five worst-performing
Soviet spin-offs have seen a decline in
measured output about twice that of their
five best-performing counterparts. More
specifically, the Central European coun-
tries appear to have adjusted more easily
than many of the Baltic states and Rus-
sia, which in turn appear to have adjusted
more easily than Kazakstan, Uzbekistan,
and the other outlying republics. A rea-
soned explanation is that the Central
European countries have a history as
market economies and have maintained a
legacy of the business practices that are
common in the West. This implies that
the economic infrastructure of these
nations is more fully developed than in
the remote republics.3
A similar, and perhaps equally dramatic,
revolution may be under way globally—
the new “technology revolution.” The
world is replacing the capital of old tech-
nologies, creating a new economic infra-
structure. As that infrastructure devel-
ops, measured output and productivity
will understate true wealth gains. More-
over, such changes may create a pros-
perity gap between countries that easily
adopt the new technology and those that
are either heavily invested in the old
technology or have little ability to gain
from it.4  Note, however, that in some
economies or in some industries, the
barriers to adopting new technology 
can be formidable. These barriers in-
clude regulatory restrictions, the wealth-
redistributive efforts of others, or even
sabotage.5
Nations which adopt an economic infra-
structure that favors production over
diversion will be more prosperous than
ones that don’t. In the case of the blos-
soming Eastern European economies,
the nations which build the infrastructure
that enables markets to flourish—the
assignment of property rights, a system
for enforcing contracts and adjudicating
disputes, and the effective management
of market failures—will be the ones that
prosper. So, too, nations that are quickest
to adopt the emerging new technologies
in the workplace will show the greatest
wealth gains.
n n    The Public 
Infrastructure of Nations
An economy’s infrastructure, broadly
speaking, is the climate created by the
institutions that serve as conduits of
commerce. Some of these institutions
are private; others are public. In either
case, their roles can be conversionary—
helping to transform resources into out-
puts—or diversionary—transferring
resources to non-producers. However,
most private institutions are sustained by
the value they add—either they produce
or they fail. The same cannot be said of
public institutions, which are sustained
by the power of the state. 
Given the seemingly inherent danger of
public institutions, perhaps the natural
first question to ask is, “Why aren’t all
institutions private?” At a most basic
level, there can be only two rationaliza-
tions for the state’s participation in an
economy. The first is as a social equal-
izer, redistributing a nation’s resources
under the presumption that some partic-
ular social need takes precedence over
private desires. The second justification
for government intervention is the asser-
tion that markets may fail to produce an
efficient outcome. 
The rationale underlying government’s
role in the economic infrastructure is cru-
cial to the prosperity of its citizenry. In
the case of equity issues, the role of the
state is unambiguous. Society makes a
choice to accept a lower level of wealth
in exchange for some presumably higher
social objective.
It is as a promoter of market efficiency
that the role of the state raises the most
complex questions. Even if the objective
is to overcome a particular market fail-
ure, once the state has been introduced
into the economic system, its influence
can have wide-ranging and unantici-
pated consequences. And these institu-
tions, which are not bound to obey mar-
ket forces, exert influence long after
their usefulness has passed. 
But market failures do occur, though
probably not as often as activist policy-
makers presume. Perhaps the most
important failure involves so-called pub-
lic goods, where providing the good for
anyone makes it possible, without addi-
tional cost, to provide it for everyone. 
A legal system and national defense 
are such goods, as is, I argue, a stable
currency. Cumulatively, these state
activities are part of the economic infra-
structure called “the protection of prop-
erty rights.” This means, more or less,
that individuals can expect to receive the
product of their labor. Although people
could privately undertake actions to pre-
vent the diversion of their output (from
burglary, for example), it is widely ac-
cepted that a social institution (such as a
police force) is a less costly mechanism
to do so. Let us be clear, however. In
order to pay for the police, or courts, or
jails, resources must also be diverted to
government from private persons in the
form of taxes.
Indeed, once introduced into the eco-
nomic infrastructure, the state cannot
help but tax the productive capacity of
the system. Sometimes these taxes are
direct and provide the sustenance for the
government enterprise. But, direct taxes
are probably only a small part of the
overall cost to the economy. Also impor-
tant are the costs on private agents who
now invest resources to minimize their
tax burdens, either through tax avoid-
ance schemes or through attempts to
influence the taxing authority. 
This is the paradox of any state enter-
prise. While the state may be the most
effective instrument in minimizing the
resource diversions of private agents (for
example, by protecting property rights
and enforcing contracts), it simultane-
ously introduces the potential for the
debilitating diversion of resources for its
own account. It is here, I think, where
the differences among nations are
grossly understated. 
A common distinction among govern-
ments is whether they are so-called capi-
talist or socialist, and in very broad terms
they define the diversionary appetites of
some government entities. Certainly a
government committed to allowing pri-
vate ownership of capital is, all other
things equal, more committed to putting
in place an economic infrastructure that
favors creation over diversion. But this is
only part of the story. Laws, threat of
expropriation, government repudiation ofcontracts—all of the things that cumula-
tively sum to the protection of property
rights—are important. 
In a recent study of the productivity of
nations, capitalist or mixed-capitalist
countries were found to have the most
effective governments with respect to
anti-diversionary commitment. But
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, two non-
capitalist countries during the study, pro-
vided “approximately the same level of
anti-diversion policies as Taiwan, Italy,
and Hong Kong.” On the other hand,
Sierra Leone and Malawi, two capitalist
nations, offer little protection against
diversionary activity. Similarly, many
nations loosely labeled as capitalist or
mixed-capitalist have borders that are rel-
atively closed to foreign trade. It is impor-
tant to consider the totality of government
attitude toward diversion to appreciate
that government’s role in either fostering
or inhibiting national productivity.
Jordan enjoys nearly twice the economic
prosperity of Egypt, at least in terms of
per capita income levels. According to
some recent estimates, government par-
ticipation in the economic infrastructure
has been a prime determinant in that dif-
ferential.6  Jordan’s anti-diversionary
policies are stronger, it is more open to
trade, and its economic organization is
less statist. These are the “common set”
of characteristics that make an economic
infrastructure successful. According to
some, these characteristics are substan-
tial enough to explain most, if not all, of
the differences in prosperity that sepa-
rate nations today, and I suspect they are
the same set of characteristics that sepa-
rated the wealth of nations in the time of
Adam Smith. 
n n    Monetary Policy and 
the Economic Infrastructure 
Applying this perspective to those of us
who call ourselves monetary policymak-
ers, we ask, “What is the role of a mone-
tary authority in a free society?” Indeed,
“Why is the government in the money
business at all?” 
The lesson here is that the relatively
stable purchasing power of the U.S. dol-
lar and a general confidence in its ability 
to hold its value over time has allowed
the dollar to become, for a time, a pre-
ferred alternative to any commodity-
based substitute. 
Fiat money economizes on scarce re-
sources in at least two ways. First, using
a printing press is vastly more cost
effective than scouring the landscape for
a rare material. Second, in a fiat mone-
tary system, all traders in the economy
have nearly the same advantage in judg-
ing the quality of a paper’s “money-
ness.” And here is the public good in
money—its acceptance in transaction.
Money is like language: It is part of the
infrastructure that allows productive
people to trade, and the more people
who use the language, the more efficient
is the communication process. And once
created, its use is not diminished by the
use of others. Indeed, its use by others
only strengthens its value in the eco-
nomic infrastructure.
Some economists challenge the view that
fiat monetary standards are more efficient
than commodity money standards with
the following analogy: “A similar argu-
ment could be made for bicycle locks and
chains. If metal locks could be replaced
with symbolic paper locks, resources
would be released that could be used pro-
ductively elsewhere. As long as thieves
honor paper locks as they would metal
locks, your bike would be perfectly
secure.”7  This brings us directly to the
question faced by modern monetary
authorities: Can the state be trusted to
provide a relatively costless monetary
system without succumbing to the
seigniorage incentive that redirects re-
sources from the private sector to the gov-
ernment sector? Or, stated alternatively, is
commodity money—which can be costly
to produce and subject to the uncertainties
of nature—ultimately more secure than
the goodwill of the state? Only the pas-
sage of time will offer an answer.
The monetary authority, like any state
institution, faces a clear conflict. As a
component of the economic infrastruc-
ture, it has the opportunity to provide an
efficient payments mechanism that
would otherwise not be provided by pri-
vate enterprise, and thereby also has the
opportunity to help the conversion of
resources into their productive ends.
But, central banks also introduce the
ability to divert the flow of resources to
the state, or to those favored by the
state and, in so doing, represent a threat
to the national infrastructure. I believe
it was the wisdom of Congress to rec-
ognize this conflict when it established
an independent central bank more than
80 years ago.
But even as an independent, state-
sponsored enterprise, the Federal Reserve
still has a diversionary face. To begin
with, we, like any public institution, are
subject to political pressure, although
perhaps less so than more direct forms of
government enterprise. Moreover, many
economists, including in the Federal Re-
serve System, continue to hold the view
that markets are inherently unstable, and
some degree of “management” should 
be provided by the monetary authority.
These are the economic activist philoso-
phies of the post-Depression era, where
money is used to direct resources toward
the manipulation of national joblessness.
Despite whatever good intentions moti-
vate such policies, this too is a clear form
of diversion—it presumes that the mone-
tary authority is in a better position to
judge the appropriate level and distribu-
tion of national production than is the
marketplace.
I believe that the failed attempts at fine-
tuning economic performance during the
late 1960s and 1970s are a clear warning
of the damaging diversionary power of
the central bank, and it is a policy that 
we must never repeat. In the end, such
efforts broke down the efficient transmis-
sion of economic information through
the monetary standard, which in turn re-
duced national investment, discouraged
productivity growth, and diminished our
position in the marketplace of interna-
tional trade.
n n    Conclusion
It’s easy to see that many of the develop-
ment disasters of the post–World War II
era have been orchestrated by brutes
whose economic agendas have been dic-
tated by military force, and whose politi-
cal tenure has often been short-lived and
bloody. But we needn’t go to such ex-
tremes to find examples where the state
commandeers resources. We can point to
the extent to which government controls
or manufactures goods, creates barriers
to trade, or impedes the adoption of new
technologies; the tax regimes imposed by
the fiscal authority; and, of course, the
choices made by the monetary authority.Today, the Federal Reserve has restored
much of its lost credibility as the provider
of a monetary standard, and we have
committed ourselves to the achievement
of a stable currency—so that among the
uncertainties that always confront private
enterprise, the value of the trade medium,
the dollar, is not among them.
Is our promise not to repeat the failures
of the past sufficient? Perhaps for the
moment it will have to be. But, we con-
tinue to call for a change in the envir-
onment in which monetary policy is
conducted. We believe specific and veri-
fiable objectives must be imposed on the
monetary authority so that in addition to
its good intention, the power of the state
is brought to bear on the central bank’s
responsibility to protect money holders’
property rights. Rather than being an
instrument of diversion, the central bank
must remain a strong and stable compo-
nent of the national infrastructure—an
infrastructure that has become the model
for nations around the world, and a foun-
dation for the strongest economy in the
history of the world.
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